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Abstract
Social media enabled a direct path from producer to consumer of contents changing the
way users get informed, debate, and shape their worldviews. Such a disintermediation
weakened consensus on social relevant issues in favor of rumors, mistrust, and fomented
conspiracy thinking – e.g., chem-trails inducing global warming, the link between
vaccines and autism, or the New World Order conspiracy.
In this work, we study through a thorough quantitative analysis how different
conspiracy topics are consumed in the Italian Facebook. By means of a semi-automatic
topic extraction strategy, we show that the most discussed contents semantically refer to
four specific categories: environment, diet, health, and geopolitics. We find similar
patterns by comparing users activity (likes and comments) on posts belonging to
different semantic categories. However, if we focus on the lifetime – i.e., the distance in
time between the first and the last comment for each user – we notice a remarkable
difference within narratives – e.g., users polarized on geopolitics are more persistent in
commenting, whereas the less persistent are those focused on diet related topics. Finally,
we model users mobility across various topics finding that the more a user is active, the
more he is likely to join all topics. Once inside a conspiracy narrative users tend to
embrace the overall corpus.
Introduction
According to [1], causation is bound to the way communities attempt to make sense to
events and facts. Such a phenomenon is particularly evident on the web where users,
immersed in homophile and polarized clusters, process information through a shared
system of meaning [2, 3]. Indeed, social media enabled a direct path from producers to
consumers of contents – i.e., disintermediation – changing the way users get informed,
debate, and shape their opinions [4–8]. However, confusion about causation encourages
speculation, rumors, and mistrust [9]. In 2011 a blogger claimed that Global Warming
was a fraud aimed at diminishing liberty and democratic tradition [10]. More recently,
rumors about Ebola caused disruption to health-care workers [11–13]. Such a scenario
fostered the production of an impressive amount of conspiracy-like narratives aimed at
explaining reality and its phenomena, and provide an unprecedented opportunity to
study the dynamics of narratives’ emergence, production, and popularity.
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Recently, we pointed out that the more the users are exposed to unsubstantiated
rumors, the more they are likely to jump the credulity barrier [2, 3]. As pointed out
by [14], individuals can be uninformed or misinformed, and the actual means of
corrections in the diffusion and formation of biased beliefs are not effective. In
particular, in [15] online debunking campaigns have been shown to create a
reinforcement effect in usual consumers of conspiracy stories. Narratives grounded on
conspiracy theories have a social role in simplifying causation because they tend to
reduce the complexity of reality and are able at the same time to contain the
uncertainty they generate [16–18]. Conspiracy theories create a climate of
disengagement from mainstream society and from officially recommended practices [19] –
e.g. vaccinations, diet, etc.
Despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about the collective intelligence [20, 21] the role of
socio-technical systems in enforcing informed debates and their effects on the public
opinion still remain unclear. However, the World Economic Forum listed massive digital
misinformation as one of the main risks for modern society [22]. A multitude of
mechanisms animates the flow and acceptance of false rumors, which in turn create false
beliefs that are rarely corrected once adopted by an individual [23–26]. The process of
acceptance of a claim (whether documented or not) may be altered by normative social
influence or by the coherence with the system of beliefs of the individual [27,28]. A
large body of literature addresses the study of social dynamics on socio-technical
systems from social contagion up to social reinforcement [6, 7, 29–36].
In this work we analyze a collection of conspiracy news sources in the Italian
Facebook. In particular, we focus on the emergence of conspiracy topics and the way
they are consumed. We identify pages diffusing conspiracy news – i.e. pages promoting
contents neglected by main stream media. We define the space of our investigation with
the help of Facebook groups very active in debunking conspiracy theses (Protesi di
Protesi di Complotto, Che vuol dire reale, La menzogna diventa verita e passa alla
storia). We categorize pages according to their contents and their self description.
Concerning conspiracy news pages, their self claimed mission is to inform people
about topics neglected by main stream media. Through a semi-automatic topic
extraction strategy, we show that the most discussed contents refer to four well specified
topics: environment, diet, health, and geopolitics. Such topics are consumed in a very
similar way by their respective audience – i.e, users activity in terms of likes and
comments on posts belonging to different categories are similar and resolves in
comparable information consumption patterns. Conversely, if we focus on the lifetime
–i.e., the distance in time between the first and the last comment for each user – we
notice a remarkable difference within topics. Users polarized on geopolitics subjects are
the most persistent in commenting, whereas the less persistent users are those focused
on diet narratives. Finally we analyze mobility of users across topics. Our findings show
that users can jump independently from one topic to another, and such a probability
increases with the user engagement. This work provides important insights about the
fruition of conspiracy like rumors in online social media and more generally about the
mechanisms behind misinformation diffusion.
Results and Discussion
The analysis aims at characterizing the topical space in the conspiracy corpus of the
Italian Facebook. We start our investigation by outlining the emerging topics and then
we focus on the information consumption patterns. Finally we provide a data-driven
model of users information consumption patterns.
Details about the mathematical and statistical tools as well as the data used in the
analysis are described in Methods section.
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Topics extraction and validation
As a first step in our analysis we apply a semi-automatic topic extraction strategy
aimed at classifying content.
We have 205, 703 posts (98.62% of the total corpus of conspiracy posts) containing a
message – i.e. a simple text or a description of the associated photo, video, or link. We
build a Document-Term matrix (205, 703 posts × 216, 696 terms) and take all the terms
with more than 500 occurrences (1820). We then apply a supervised preprocessing in
order to identify terms related to the conspiracy storytelling. Such a supervised task is
performed by 20 volunteers separately1. The resulting set is composed by 159 terms.
Then, we derive the co-occurrence network of conspiracy terms – i.e., a graph where
nodes are conspiracy terms, edges bond two nodes if the corresponding terms are found
in the same post, and weights associated to edges indicate the number of times the two
terms appear together in the corpus. Such a graph has 159 nodes and 11, 840 edges.
Since the co-occurrence network is a dense graph, we apply a filter in order to
remove edges which are not significant. More precisely, we apply the disparity filter
algorithm [37] (see Methods section for details) to extract the network backbone
structure, thus reducing the number of edges while preserving its multi-scale nature.
The application of the filtering algorithm with a statistical significance level of α = 0.05
results in a graph with 159 nodes and 1, 126 edges. We asked to the volunteers to give a
generic class to each term. By accounting only for 90% of concordance within volunteers
tags on names, the semantics of conspiracy terms results in four main categories:
environment, health, diet, and geopolitics. In Figure 1 we show the backbone of the
co-occurrence term network, where different colors indicate nodes belonging to different
conspiracy class.
HEALTHGEOPOLITICS
ENVIRONMENTDIET
Figure 1. Backbone of conspiracy terms co-occurence network. Different
colors indicate nodes belonging to different conspiracy topics according to our manual
classification. In particular, purple nodes belong to geopolitics, red nodes to
environment, blue nodes to health, and green to diet.
1We consider as conspiracy terms only those terms labeled as conspiratorial by at least the 90% of
volunteers.
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To validate the classification, we apply three different community detection
algorithms – i.e., Walktrap [38], Multilevel [39], and Fast greedy [40] (see Methods
section for further details) – to the backbone of conspiracy terms co-occurence network.
In Figure 2 we show the classification provided by each community detection
algorithm. Multilevel and Walktrap algorithms assign each term to the same community
and their accuracy with respect to our manual classification is 100%, while the
concordance index of the Fast greedy algorithm is 88.68%.
(a) Walktrap (b) Multilevel (c) Fast greedy
Figure 2. Communities of conspiracy terms. Membership of conspiracy terms
according to different community detection algorithms. Purple nodes belong to
geopolitics, red nodes to environment, blue nodes to health, and green to diet.
We assign a post to a given topic according to the term in it. In case of terms
belonging to different topics, we apply the majority rule, in case of ties, the post is not
labeled. Through such a criterion we are able to label 44, 259 posts – i.e. 9, 137
environment posts, 8, 668 health posts, 3, 762 diet posts, and 22, 692 geopolitics posts.
Attention patterns
Content consumption
In order to characterize how information belonging to the different categories of
conspiracy topics are consumed, we perform a quantitative analysis on users’
interactions – i.e. likes, shares, and comments2.
In Figure 3 we show the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs)3
of the number of likes, comments, and shares received by posts belonging to different
conspiracy categories of topics. Likes, comments, and shares of posts are long-tailed
distributed and best fitted by discrete power law distributions. To further characterize
differences within the distributions, in Table 1 we summarize the estimated lower
bounds and scaling parameters for each distribution.
2Notice that each of these actions has a particular meaning [41]. A like stands for a positive feedback
to the post; a share expresses the will to increase the visibility of a given information; and a comment is
the way in which online collective debates take form around the topic promoted by posts. Comments
may contain negative or positive feedbacks with respect to the post.
3We prefer to show CCDFs rather than CDFs since the former allow to plot heavy-tailed distributions
in doubly logarithmic axes, and thus emphasize their long tail behavior.
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Figure 3. Topics attention patterns. Complementary cumulative distribution
functions (CCDFs) of the number of likes (a), comments (b), and shares (c) received by
posts belonging to different conspiracy topics.
Likes Comments Shares
xˆmin αˆ xˆmin αˆ xˆmin αˆ
Environment 142 2.82 42 2.82 408 2.62
Health 172 2.68 37 2.59 435 2.39
Diet 135 2.84 15 2.36 358 2.59
Geopolitics 167 2.36 135 3.14 407 2.25
Table 1. Power law fit of conspiracy topics attention patterns. Lower bounds
and scaling parameters estimates for the distributions of the number of likes, comments,
and shares received by posts belonging to different conspiracy topics.
To analyze lifetime of posts from different categories, we compute the temporal
distance between the first and last comment for each post. In Figure 4 we show the
Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions (see Methods for further details) for posts
belonging to different conspiracy topics. The p-value associated to the Gehan-Wilcoxon
test (a modification of the log-rank test) is p = 0.091, which lets us conclude that there
are not significant statistical differences between the survival functions of posts
belonging to different conspiracy topics.
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Figure 4. Lifetime of conspiracy topics. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival
functions of posts belonging to different conspiracy topics.
Our findings show that conspiracy topics are consumed in a similar way. In
particular, we find that survival functions of posts belonging to different conspiracy
topics do not show different statistical signatures.
Users activity
Here, we consider users’ attention patterns with respect to different conspiracy topics by
analyzing the number of likes and comments, as well as the lifetime of each user – i.e.
the temporal distance between his first comment and last comment on a post belonging
to a specific category – that can be intended as an approximation of users persistence in
online collective debating.
We consider as conspiracy users those whose liking activity on conspiracy pages is
greater than the 95% of their total liking activity – i.e. a conspiracy user left at most
5% of her likes on posts belonging to science pages. Such a method allows to identify
790, 899 conspiracy users. Moreover, we consider a user polarized towards a given
conspiracy topic if she has more than the 95% of her likes on posts belonging to that
topic. Such a criterion allows to classify 232, 505 users (29.39% of the total). Table 2
summarizes the classification task’s results. We observe that the majority of users is
concerned about conspiracy stories related to geopolitics (62.95%), whereas conspiracy
narratives about environment (18.39%) and health (12.73%) attract a smaller yet
substantial number of users, while diet (5.94%) seems to be considered a less attractive
subject. However, notice that here we are analyzing conspiracy users that have the most
of their total activity on a given topic. Indeed, Figure 3 shows that diet receives as
much attention as the other conspiracy topics, even if it is not a polarizing topic, as
shown in Table 2.
In Figure 5 we show the CCDFs of the number of likes and comments of users
polarized towards different conspiracy topics. We observe minor yet significant
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Users %
Geopolitics 146, 359 62.95
Environment 42, 750 18.39
Health 29, 587 12.73
Diet 13, 807 5.94
Table 2. Polarization of users towards different conspiracy topics.
differences between attention patterns of different conspiracy users. Table 3 summarizes
the estimated lower bounds and scaling parameters for each distribution. These results
show that users polarized towards different conspiracy topics consume information in a
comparable way – i.e, with some differences all are well described by a power law.
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Figure 5. Users attention patterns. CCDFs of the number of likes (a) and
comments (b) by users polarized on different conspiracy topics.
Likes Comments
xˆmin αˆ xˆmin αˆ
Environment 5 4.37 3 2.49
Health 5 2.51 3 2.56
Diet 4 5.52 3 2.94
Geopolitics 6 3.61 6 2.88
Table 3. Powerlaw fit of conspiracy users attention patterns. Lower bounds
and scaling parameters estimates for the distributions of the number of likes and
comments left by users polarized towards different conspiracy topics.
In order to analyze the persistence of users polarized towards different conspiracy
topics, we compute the temporal distance between the first and last comment of each
user on posts belonging to the conspiracy topic on which the user is polarized. In Figure
6 we show the Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions (see Methods section for
further details) for conspiracy users polarized towards different topics.
The Gehan-Wilcoxon test assesses a significant difference between the four survival
functions (all p-values are less than 10−6).
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Figure 6. Persistence of conspiracy users. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival
functions for users polarized towards different conspiracy topics.
Summarizing, we observe minor yet significant differences in the way users polarized
towards different conspiracy topics consume information. Moreover, by focusing on the
lifetime – i.e. the temporal distance between users’ first and last comment – we find a
remarkable difference within those users. In particular, we notice that users polarized
on geopolitics subjects are the most persistent in commenting, whereas the less
persistent users are those focused on diet narratives.
Modeling user mobility
In this section we focus on users’ activity across different conspiracy topics. In Table 4
we summarize users’ behavior by showing the Pearson correlations of their liking
activity within the different categories of topics. We see meaningful correlations
between the liking activity of users across different conspiracy topics.
Envir Health Diet GeoPol
Envir 1.00 0.68 0.61 0.64
Health 1.00 0.78 0.65
Diet 1.00 0.48
GeoPol 1.00
Table 4. Mobility of users across topics. Pearson correlations coefficients of
conspiracy users’ liking activity between different categories.
We analyze the relationship between the engagement of a user – i.e. the number of
likes she left on conspiracy posts – and how her activity is distributed across categories.
Figure 7 shows that the more a conspiracy user is engaged the more his activity is
distributed across different conspiracy topics.
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Figure 7. Engagement and mobility across topics. Light blue lines represent the
median of the likes distributions; pale blue shaded boxes represent the interquartile
range (25–75 percentile); horizontal bars represent the extremes of the distributions.
Users active on 4 topics are 15, 510; users active on 3 topics are 20, 929; users active on
2 topics are 21, 631; and users active on 1 topic are 9, 980.
By considering only users with at least 4 likes (n = 68, 050) – necessary condition to
be active on the four identified topics – we can model the relationship between the
number of likes and the number of considered topics by means of a proportional odds
model (see Methods section for an extended discussion).
In particular, we consider the number of topics liked by users as the ordinal
dependent variable, i.e. we have j = (K − 1) = 3 ordered categories: 1|2, 2|3, and 3|4.
We consider the number of likes left by users as the predictor of our model. Thus, we
need to estimate three intercepts and one regression coefficient. Table 5 reports details
about the performed regression.
The estimated coefficient, β, can be difficult to interpret because it is scaled in terms
of logs. Another way to interpret these kind of regression models is to convert the
coefficient into a odds ratio (see Methods section for further details). To get the odds
ratio (OR) we exponentiate the estimate:
OR = exp(β) = exp(0.1141) = 1.12
Since OR > 1, an increase in the number of likes left by a user raises her probability
to consider a greater number of topics. In particular, an increase in the number of likes
is associated with 12% times increased odds of considering a higher number of topics.
The model provides four probabilities for each user to belong to one of the four
categories. For each user we consider the category associated with the higher
probability as the predicted category. In order to evaluate the goodness of fit of the
model, we compare the predicted categories vs the real ones by means of the absolute
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Coefficients Value Std. Error t-value p-value
# of likes 0.1141 0.001016 112.3 < 10−6
Intercepts Value Std. Error t-value p-value
1|2 -0.7602 0.0135 -56.4267 < 10−6
2|3 1.0783 0.0126 85.7607 < 10−6
3|4 2.9648 0.0177 167.4990 < 10−6
Table 5. Proportional Odds Model. Log-odds regression coefficient and intercepts
with related standard errors, t-values, and p-values. Confidence interval at 95% for the
estimated coefficient is (0.1121, 0.1161). Chi-Square test’s p-value is 1, so we do not
reject the null hypothesis (H0 : current model is good enough) and conclude that the
model is a good fit.
distance coefficient and we find that:
δ = 1−
∑ |di|
n(K − 1) = 0.852,
where |di| = |xi − yi| is the absolute distance between the real and the predicted
categories, n is the total number of users, and K is the number of categories. Since the
absolute distance coefficient is close to 1, the proposed model provides a good fit for the
data.
Summarizing, the more a user is engaged in conspiracy storytelling the more her
probability to consider a higher number of different conspiracy topics. Indeed, we
deliver a data-driven model of information consumption pointing out that users
engagement on different topics is mainly driven by their overall commitment on
conspiracy storytelling and that with the increasing of the engagement they tend to
embrace the overall corpus without a specific pattern.
Conclusions
Conspiracy theories are considered to belong to false beliefs overlooking the pervasive
unintended consequences of political and social action [9, 42]. Social media fostered the
production of an impressive amount of rumors, mistrust, and conspiracy-like narratives
aimed at explaining (and oversimplifying) reality and its phenomena. Such a scenario
provides an unprecedented opportunity to study the dynamics of topics emergence,
production, and popularity. Indeed, in this work we focus on how conspiracy topics are
consumed in the Italian Facebook.
The understanding of consumption patterns behind unsubstantiated claims might
provide important insight both at the level of popularity of topics as well as to prevent
misinformation spreading. Users activity in terms of likes and comments on posts
belonging to different categories are similar and resolves in similar information
consumption patterns. Conversely, if we focus on the lifetime – i.e., the distance in time
between the first and the last comment for each user – we notice a remarkable difference
within topics. Users polarized on geopolitics subjects are the most persistent in
commenting, whereas the less persistent users are those focused on diet narratives.
Finally we focus on the mobility of users across topics. In particular we address the
patterns behind the consumption of different topics. Users can jump independently
from one topic to another, and such a probability increases with the user engagement
(number of likes on a specific topic). Each new like on the same category increases of
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the 12% the probability to pass to a new one. Our work provides important insights
about the diffusion and emergence of misinformed narratives.
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Methods
Data Collection
We define the space of our investigation with the help of some Facebook groups very
active in the debunking of conspiracy theses. The resulting dataset is composed by 39
public Italian Facebook pages.
Notice that the dataset is the same used in [2] and [43]. However, in this paper we
focus on the 39 (exhaustive set) conspiracy pages with the intent to further characterize
the attention dynamics driving the diffusion of conspiracy topics on the Italian
Facebook. We download all posts from these pages in a timespan of 4 years (2010 to
2014). In addition, we collect all the likes and comments from the posts, and we count
the number of shares. In total, we collect around 9M likes and 1M comments,
performed by about 1.2M and 280K Facebook users, respectively. In Table 6 we
summarize the details of the data collection.
Entity Total
Pages 39
Posts 208, 591
Likes 6, 659, 382
Comments 836, 591
Shares 16, 326, 731
Likers 864, 047
Commenters 226, 534
Table 6. Breakdown of the Facebook dataset.
Preliminaries and Definitions
Bipartite Network. We consider a bipartite network whose nodes are conspiracy
posts and conspiracy terms. The presence of a term on a given post determines a link
between the term and the post. More formally, a bipartite graph is a triple
G = (A,B,E) where A = {ai | i = 1, . . . , nA} and B = {bj | j = 1, . . . , nB} are two
disjoint sets of nodes, and E ⊆ A×B is the set of edges – i.e. edges exist only between
nodes of the two different sets A and B. The bipartite graph G is described by the
matrix M defined as
Mij =
{
1 if an edge exists between ai and bj
0 otherwise
Referring to A as the set of conspiracy terms, in our analysis we use the
co-occurrence matrix CA =MMT , that is the weighted adjacency matrix of the
co-occurrence of conspiracy terms on conspiracy posts. Each non-zero element of CA
corresponds to an edge among nodes ai and aj with weight P
A
ij .
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Disparity Filter. Disparity filter is a network reduction algorithm which extracts
the backbone structure of a weighted network, thus reducing its size without destroying
its multi-scale nature. In particular, the method introduced in [37] is based on the null
hypothesis that the normalized weights corresponding to the connections of a given
node with degree k are uniformly distributed. The disparity filter identifies which links
for each node should be preserved in the network. The null model allows such a
discrimination through the computation – for each edge of a given node – of the
probability αij that its normalized weight pij is compatible with the null hypothesis. All
the links with αij smaller than a certain significance level α reject the null hypothesis,
and can be considered as significant heterogeneities characterizing the network. The
statistically significant edges will be those whose weights satisfy the relation
αij = 1− (k − 1)
∫ pij
0
(1− x)k−2dx < α,
indicating that by decreasing the significance level α we can filter out additional
links, and thus focus on more relevant edges.
Community Detection Algorithms. In order to validate our manual classification
of conspiracy terms, we apply three well known community detection algorithms to the
backbone of the conspiracy terms co-occurrence network.
Walktrap [38] computes a measure of similarities between nodes based on random
walks which has several important advantages: it captures well the community structure
in a network, it can be computed efficiently, and it can be used in an agglomerative
algorithm to compute efficiently the community structure of a network. Such an
algorithm runs in time O(mn2) and space O(n2) in the worst case, and in time
O(n2 log n) and space O(n2) in most real-world cases, where n and m are respectively
the number of nodes and edges in the network.
Multilevel [39] is based on multilevel modularity optimization. Initially, each node is
assigned to a community on its own. In every step, nodes are re-assigned to
communities in a local, greedy way. Nodes are moved to the community in which they
achieve the highest modularity. Such an algorithm runs in linear time when m ∼ n,
where n and m are respectively the number of nodes and edges in the network.
Fast greedy [40] it is a hierarchical agglomeration algorithm for detecting community
structure. Its running time on a network with n nodes and m edges is O(md log n)
where d is the depth of the dendrogram describing the community structure. Many
real-world networks are sparse and hierarchical, with m ∼ n and d ∼ log n, in which
case such an algorithm runs in essentially linear time, O(n log2 n).
Kaplan-Meier estimator. Let us define a random variable T on the interval [0,∞),
indicating the time an event takes place. The cumulative distribution function (CDF),
F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t), indicates the probability that such an event takes place within a
given time t. The survival function, defined as the complementary CDF (CCDF4) of T ,
represents the probability that an event lasts beyond a given time period t. To estimate
this probability we use the Kaplan–Meier estimator [44].
Let nt denote the number of that commented before a given time step t, and let dt
denote the number of users that stop commenting precisely at t. Then, the estimated
survival probability after time t is defined as (nt − dt)/nt. Thus, if we have N
observations at times t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tN , assuming that the events at times ti are jointly
4We remind that the CCDF of a random variable X is one minus the CDF, the function f(x) =
Pr(X > x).
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independent, the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function at time t is defined as
Sˆ(t) =
∏
ti<t
(
nti − dti
nti
).
Odds ratio. Probability and odds are two basic statistical terms to describe the
likeliness that an event will occur. Probability is defined5 as the fraction of desired
outcomes in the context of every possible outcome with a value in [0, 1], where 0 would
be an impossible event and 1 would represent an inevitable event. Conversely, odds can
assume any value in [0,∞), and they represent a ratio of desired outcomes versus
undesired outcomes. Given a desired outcome A, the relationship between the
probability P (A) that event A will occur, and its odds O(A) is
P (A) =
O(A)
1 +O(A)
and O(A) =
P (A)
1− P (A) .
It follows that the odds ratio (OR) of two events A and B is defined as
OR(A,B) =
O(A)
O(B)
=
P (A)
1−P (A)
P (B)
1−P (B)
=
P (A)[1− P (B)]
P (B)[1− P (A)] .
Proportional Odds Model. The proportional odds model is a class of generalized
linear models used for modeling the dependence of an ordinal response on discrete or
continuous covariates.
Formally, let Y denote the response category in the range 1, . . . ,K with K ≥ 2, and
let pij = Pr(Y ≤ j |x) be the cumulative response probability when the covariate
assumes value x. The most general form of linear logistic model for the jth cumulative
response probability,
logit(pij) = ln
(
pij
1− pij
)
= αj + β
T
j x,
is one in which both the intercept α and the regression coefficient β depend on the
category j. The proportional odds model is a linear logistic model in which the
intercepts depend on j, but the slopes are all equal, i.e.
logit(pij) = ln
(
pij
1− pij
)
= αj + β
Tx.
In other words, proportional odds model takes logistic regression one step further in
order to account for ordered categorical responses. For instance, in our analysis we
could have used a logistic regression model to investigate the effect of the number of
comments on the odds ratio (OR) of ”considering < 3 topics” vs ”considering ≥ 3
topics”. However, in such a case the cut-point would be arbitrary, and we could have
used a similar logistic regression model to analyze the effect on the odds ratio (OR) of
”considering < 2 topics” vs ”considering ≥ 2 topics”. In this sense, proportional odds
model averages up over all possible cut-point logistic regression models to maximize the
amount of information one can get out of the data.
5For the sake of brevity we consider only the frequentist approach.
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